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Design principles for corporate venture transition processes in 
established technology firms 
 
Abstract 
Corporate venturing has become a well-known approach towards new business development 
and strategic renewal for established technology firms. However, without an effectively 
designed process for aligning and integrating a corporate venture in the established business, 
the firm increases the risk of venture failure. This paper provides a process perspective on 
corporate venture transition. Based on the results of an empirical study of six corporate 
venture transition processes we present suitable actions for each of the different phases of the 
venture transition process. In addition, we indicate the proper timing for venture transition, 
which is one of the long-standing difficulties in this area. Finally, we integrate the results of 
the empirical study with knowledge from extant literature in a set of design principles. These 
design principles provide practical guidelines to improve corporate venture transition 
processes.
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1. Introduction 
In a business environment characterized by rapid technological changes, large established 
technology firms are increasingly looking for ways to acquire new technological capabilities 
and to explore new business opportunities in order to survive in the long run (Govindarajan 
and Trimble, 2005; Vanhaverbeke and Peeters, 2005). However, commercializing these new 
technological capabilities in a corporate organization primarily designed to exploit existing 
products and technologies is difficult. Financial systems and bureaucratic procedures adopted 
to control established processes tend to be hostile towards innovative ideas and initiatives, 
especially when these ideas are radical and competency-destroying (Dess et al., 2003).  
 One of the solutions to this problem is to adopt a corporate venturing approach. A 
corporate venture is a self-contained division with resources to manage new product 
development projects from beginning to end (Jones, 2010). Corporate venturing is here 
defined as the exploration and commercialization of new technologies or products, 
structurally separated from the corporate organization’s exploitation tasks in a corporate 
venturing ‘incubation’ structure that mediates organizational rigidities and supports 
organizational renewal (Ambos et al., 2008; Dess et al., 2003; O'Connor and DeMartino, 
2006; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996). This approach is especially relevant when the 
technology of the venture is still in an embryonic phase, laden with a lot of technical and 
market uncertainty. Once the uncertainties are reduced to an acceptable level, the corporation 
can utilize the full commercial potential inhibited in the new technology. If the venture 
appears not to fit the established business strategy, the venture can become a stand-alone 
spin-off and attract external funding, or be sold to another firm. But, ideally, the venture 
should be transferred to the established business to rejuvenate the corporation with new 
technological capabilities and new business opportunities 
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 Yet, the chances of successful transition are quite low; some report chances lower than 
10% (Campbell and Park, 2004). In particular the final transition phase of the corporate 
venture process, which consists of the integration of the venture into the parent organization 
after successful incubation, is very challenging (McGrath and Keil, 2007). Corporate ventures 
can be perceived as a threat to the established businesses of the corporate organization, or 
may lack legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Chesbrough and Tucci, 2005; Levinthal and 
March, 1993). A nice illustration of these challenges is the way aluminum producer Alcoa 
dealt with its venture focusing on developing a new aircraft material called Glare (see 
Berends et al., 2011; Van Burg et al. 2008). This new material consisted of a combination of 
aluminum and glass fibers. Although the material was first considered as an opportunity for 
rejuvenating the aluminum product line, as soon as the aircraft industry started to show real 
interest, Alcoa’s managers considered it more and more as a cannibalizing product. This 
prevented good cooperation with and integration in Alcoa’s established business. Eventually, 
the venture was set on hold and parts were sold to other organizations.   
 Despite the difficulty of venture transition, the current literature is relatively silent about 
the design of the venture transition process and as a consequence leaves unexplained how to 
transfer corporate ventures to the established business environment (Ford et al., 2010) and 
when is the best time for this transition (e.g., O'Connor and DeMartino, 2006). 
Notwithstanding the important insights of existing studies on corporate venturing, we know 
little about the ‘process attributes of successful venturing’ (Miles and Covin, 2002). Although 
several scholars advocate the view of internal corporate venturing as a process (e.g., 
Burgelman, 1983; Dess et al., 2003; O'Connor and DeMartino, 2006), many variance models 
are present in the literature (e.g., Birkinshaw and Hill, 2003; Burgers et al., 2009; Raisch and 
Birkinshaw, 2008). These models provide a useful context when studying venture processes, 
but do not tell how events unfold over time and focus on the antecedents of the venturing 
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process rather than on the activities and behaviors that embody the process itself (Kang and 
Uhlenbruck, 2006; Van de Ven and Engleman, 2004). Those studies that develop a process 
model of internal corporate venturing do not provide clear general criteria for decision 
making that guide the transition of the venture into the established business. For example, the 
widely used model of Burgelman (1983) distinguishes between four different stages of 
internal venture development – a conceptual, a pre-venture, an entrepreneurial and an 
organizational stage – but ends before the actual transition of the venture to an existing 
business unit. Thus, a process perspective on the next step, the corporate venture transition 
process, which integrates the viewpoints of the corporate venture, the established business, 
and the corporate venturing unit, is lacking (Ford et al., 2010; Miles and Covin, 2002).  
 Therefore, this paper takes a process perspective on corporate venturing, and focuses on 
the corporate venture transition process. The research question of this study is: How and 
when to transfer corporate ventures in established technology firms? We aim to specify 
particular actions for each of the phases of the venture development and transfer process: pre-
transition, transition, and post-transition. Based on an empirical study of six corporate 
venture transition processes, we describe how the corporate venture transition process can be 
approached. Subsequently, we integrate the results of the empirical study with knowledge 
from extant literature in a set of design principles. More specifically, this study makes two 
key contributions to the existing corporate venturing literature. First, the design principles 
summarize key insights regarding how to successfully transfer corporate ventures. Second, 
we identify the most appropriate timing for venture transition, indicating when to transfer a 
corporate venture from the venturing unit to the established business.  
 This paper is structured in the following way. The next section reviews briefly the 
relevant literature dealing with the transition process. Section 3 describes the empirical 
procedures and the design science methodology. Based on the empirical study, section 4 
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presents solutions for corporate venture transition process and transition timing. 
Subsequently, section 5 integrates the empirical results with existing literature in a set of 
design principles. The paper ends with a discussion of the main results.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
More and more companies have become interested in corporate venturing as a way to 
organizational rejuvenation. Researchers have addressed this phenomenon by studying how 
environmental conditions, organizational architectures and individual-level cognitions 
influence corporate venturing and its outcomes (Ireland et al., 2009; Narayanan et al., 2009). 
Regarding the transition of corporate ventures to the established organization, the existing 
literature paid attention to the degree of strategic fit and potential tensions, while also some 
literature has provided insights in the transition process itself.  
 
2.1 Established organizations and ventures: strategic fit and tensions  
One of the central elements influencing the transition of the corporate ventures to the 
established organization is the degree of strategic fit (Thornhill and Amit, 2001). As these 
ventures are established with the aim of bringing important innovations inside the established 
company, eventually the ventures have to be absorbed in one way or another by this 
established organization. The chances of successfully integrating a corporate venture are 
higher if the venture has strategic fit with the established company, for instance by serving 
markets adjacent to those of the established business and requiring assets and supply channels 
that are provided by the existing operations (Gilsing et al., 2010; Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008; 
Thornhill and Amit, 2001). In addition, it is easier to incorporate ventures that are related to 
existing businesses, because there is a high amount of absorptive capacity that facilitates 
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combining corporate venture’s capabilities with existing business processes (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001).  
 Even in the presence of strategic fit, the transition process is challenging. The venture 
has matured, grown out of the protected status at the venturing unit and requires a renewed 
relationship with the corporate parent to further develop (Garvin and Levesque, 2006). After 
the transition, the venture team finds itself in a new environment often filled with 
organizational antibodies, which makes the post-transition period in venture development 
critical (Burgers et al., 2009). Due to fundamental differences in business dynamics, logic, 
and risk taking behavior, interactions between the new venture and established business 
create tensions (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006; Gilsing et al., 2010; Levinthal and March, 
1993). Moreover, corporate ventures may be perceived as a threat to the established business 
of the corporate organization, because they can challenge current technologies, cannibalize 
products, and compete for scarce corporate resources (Chesbrough and Tucci, 2005). In 
addition, corporate ventures may lack legitimation of their technology, product and business 
model because it is new, disruptive and different (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Levinthal and 
March, 1993). To use Roberts and Berry’s (1985) typology, the higher the newness and 
unfamiliarity, the harder it is to fit a venture into an existing business unit. The transition may 
eventually result in a “forced-fit”, which will cause organizational resistance from the 
receiving business unit (Rice et al., 2002).  
 
2.2 Existing insights in the transition process 
A few studies have addressed some aspects of the venture transition process and paid 
attention to how the tensions could be mitigated. Related to the pre-transition phase, research 
found that preparation activities are increasing the chances of the actual successful transition 
of the venture to the established business (Kanter, 1989; Kanter et al., 1991; Rice et al., 
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2002). It is proposed that such preparation activities could include forming a transition team 
and performing a transition readiness assessment with questions about technical, market, 
organizational, and resource aspects of the venture (Maine, 2008; Rice et al., 2002). The goal 
of such a readiness assessment is to achieve mutual agreement on the amount of progress that 
both parties need to achieve and to determine the right transition time. Rice et al. (2002) 
suggest that the transition team uses the transition readiness assessment to develop a 
transition plan, which could facilitate the transition process. The process of developing a 
shared transition plan may lead to awareness, commitment, and connection, which are related 
to venture success (Thornhill and Amit, 2001). Moreover, creating appropriate governance 
structures supports the transition process, for instance by having effective management at the 
board level (Zahra et al., 2009) and organizing formal cross-functional interfaces (Jansen et 
al., 2009). Multiple studies stress that corporate ‘champions’ with sufficient discretionary 
power can build bridges between the venture and the corporate environment and serve to 
smoothen the process by advocating the venture’s needs (Day, 1994; Garvin and Levesque, 
2006; Henderson and Leleux, 2002).  
 One particular challenging aspect of the venture transition process is to determine the 
timing of transition. When is the venture ready to be incorporated in the existing business? 
Premature venture transition is associated with transition failure and reduced post-transition 
performance (Ford et al., 2010; Leifer et al., 2001; O'Connor and DeMartino, 2006). When 
the corporate organization integrates the venture too late, the established business might miss 
its window of opportunity or its first mover advantage. When transferring too early, many 
market and technology uncertainties may not be resolved or corporate management may force 
corporate ventures into established business units, while they might have grown into a 
complete new business group. However, existing literature does not provide useful indicators 
to set the right moment for transition (see O'Connor and DeMartino, 2006).  
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 Related to the post-transition phase, studies show that rewarding entrepreneurial 
behavior is important to sustain the entrepreneurial behavior and the entrepreneurial mindset 
(McGrath and MacMillan, 2000) of the former venturing team and key personnel and to keep 
them on board (Sykes, 1986; Van de Vrande et al., 2006). The established business is geared 
towards control, efficiency and exploitation, which often contrasts with the entrepreneurial 
behavior (Garvin and Levesque, 2006; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996). A key aspect of the 
entrepreneurial behavior is the ability of the former venture team to deal with uncertainty 
(Sarasvathy, 2001), whereas the established business stimulates risk reducing behavior These 
differences ask for a tailored management approach (Kanter, 1985). Therefore, reward 
structures and performance measurement systems should be adapted to enable continuing the 
right entrepreneurial behavior of the corporate venture, while simultaneously aligning 
interests with the established business (Teece, 2007). This alignment is not only a matter of 
adapting management systems, but also involves a cognitive adaptation to the new 
environment to make sense of the new (Schildt, Maula, and Keil, 2005). In particular if the fit 
with the established business is low, in terms of product-market combinations and ways of 
operating, this adaptation would require time and dedicated effort (Keil, 2004).  
 In sum, existing literature points at crucial elements influencing the transitions process, 
such as strategic fit, potential tensions and continued autonomy. Moreover, suggestions are 
done about facilitating the transition process. Yet, we still lack more detailed guidelines about 
how and when to transfer corporate ventures. Therefore, practical design principles are 
needed to develop a transition process that integrates the perspectives of the corporate 
venture, the established business and the corporate venturing unit.  
 
3. Methods  
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To answer the research question how and when to transfer corporate ventures, we combine an 
empirical study of six corporate venture transition processes at two established technology 
firms with a design science approach. The empirical study offers insight in the process of 
corporate venture transition. Employing a design science approach, we use these empirical 
results to develop a set of design principles guiding managers in actually managing the 
corporate venture transition process.  
 The main advantage of the design science approach is that it enables connecting 
empirical results describing what ‘already is’ with developing knowledge about creating 
something that does not exist yet (Simon, 1996). Design science methodology offers 
guidelines by connecting dispersed scientific knowledge to the pragmatic and creative work 
of practitioners. Design science research has been employed in fields such as information 
systems , accounting and education (see Van Aken and Romme, 2009), and has recently been 
introduced and further developed in the field of management studies (Jelinek et al., 2008; 
Romme, 2003; Van Aken, 2004), where it is, for instance, applied on the topic of university 
spin-offs (Gilsing et al., 2010; Van Burg et al., 2008). Design science research focuses on 
developing design principles that provide the main guidelines to develop targeted solutions 
for a problem in a specific context (Van Aken and Romme, 2009). Design principles “involve 
a coherent set of normative ideas and propositions, grounded in (e.g., entrepreneurship) 
research, which serve to design and construct detailed solutions” (Van Burg et al., 2008: 
116). These principles form a ‘boundary’ object between the prescriptive and pragmatic 
nature of the design process of organizing corporate venturing and the descriptive nature of 
corporate venturing research (Romme and Endenburg, 2006). Often, design principles are 
developed by combining the results of a targeted empirical study with a review of the 
available literature (Denyer et al., 2008; Van Burg et al., 2008), as we will do in section 5 by 
combining our empirical results with existing literature on corporate venture transition, 
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leading to design principles grounded in theory and practice. Figure 1 illustrates the 
connection between research findings and design practice according to the design science 
approach. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
3.1 Empirical setting 
The empirical data are gathered in six corporate venture transition processes at two 
established technology firms. The selection of six cases embedded in two different corporate 
environments enables us to control to some extent for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
corporate environment (as we have three cases in each established firm) while there also is 
sufficient meaningful variety (as we can contrast both established firms). The two 
Netherlands-based multinationals, which we called ChemCo and PhysCo to disguise their 
real names, were selected because they are established, active in technology industries and 
use corporate venturing as a means for their corporate innovation and growth strategies.  
 ChemCo is a chemical company with businesses all over the world. ChemCo installed an 
Innovation Centre to manage the innovation efforts company-wide. Besides the development 
of radical innovation projects, this Innovation Centre supports other (more incremental) 
innovation projects, and heads corporate licensing, venturing and intellectual property rights 
(IPR) activities. The ventures included in this study were transferred or had to be transferred 
to different business units.  
 PhysCo is an electronics company that implemented a new innovation driven strategy by 
separating its most promising innovation activities from the established business 
organization. PhysCo chose to structure its new business development and growth strategy 
according to three pillars: R&D service, intellectual property creation and licensing, and 
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incubation in a corporate venturing organization. Ventures included in this study transferred 
from the corporate venturing organization to several business units.  
 At both ChemCo and PhysCo, three corporate ventures were identified that met the 
following criteria: the venture was developed while being separated from the established 
business and the venture was in the transition process or had already been integrated. To 
capture the complete transition process as accurate as possible, the ventures selected in this 
study were in different stages of the transition process (pre-transition, transition and post-
transition). Table 1 shows the characteristics of the six ventures. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here  
---------------------------- 
 
3.2 Data collection  
Data was collected by interviews with corporate venture founders and managers (corporate 
venture perspective), managers from the adopting business units (business unit and 
established business perspective) and corporate management (corporate organization and 
corporate venturing unit perspective). Interviews from these three perspectives on the 
success, tensions, problems and progress of the venture’s transition process resulted in a 
variety of insights. In total 16 face-to-face interviews of 1 to 1,5 hour were performed, which 
were recorded, transcribed and coded (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The QSR NVivo 
software served to store and classify the data sources and to perform the coding 
systematically. A second round of six interviews with the corporate venture founders and 
managers was performed to check and complement the description and analysis of each 
corporate venture. In addition, archival data were collected, consisting of official corporate 
documents such as transition plans and periodical venture review reports. 
3.3 Data analysis  
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Document analysis served to form an understanding of the context. Written documentation 
regarding the corporate venturing programs at PhysCo and ChemCo and the involved 
corporate ventures was reviewed. Moreover, written documentation in the form of official 
learning- and review documents regarding the Alpha, Gamma and Delta venture transition 
trajectories was analyzed. Next, the interview transcripts were analyzed by using open coding 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998) to identify transition process phases, actions and key themes. Case 
descriptions for corporate venture were developed, which were validated with the 
interviewees. Case summaries for each corporate venture are displayed in Table 2.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here  
---------------------------- 
 
3.4 Design principles 
The design principles are constructed by combining the empirical study with a literature 
review. From practice, design solutions can be observed, which can serve to codify the 
underlying design principles. A synthesis of current research findings can further inform the 
construction of the design principles. Three steps are taken in this study to identify, create 
and validate design principles, based on Van Burg et al. (2008). 
 First, by analyzing the data gathered in multiple corporate venture transition processes, a 
preliminary version of the design principles was derived. Interviewee expressions that were 
comparable to the heuristic form of design principles were coded as themes applicable in 
potential design principles and collected accordingly. Accounts of problems and 
corresponding solutions served to create design principles that were more implicitly 
expressed by the interviewees. Subsequently, corresponding themes were clustered, enabling 
the creation of more generic design principles.  
 Second, by conducting a literature review on relevant bodies of literature, we tried to 
further underpin the preliminary design principles and to analyze which aspects were already 
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covered in the literature and which aspects provided rather new insights. We searched 
entrepreneurship, strategic management and innovation management literatures with nine 
search strings, including ‘corporate entrepreneurship’, ‘new business development’ and 
‘established firms’, and ‘technology commercialization’. The complete list of sources was 
reviewed on quality and relevance criteria, including the journal’s impact factor. As we focus 
on established profit-oriented technology firms, we excluded studies of non-profit or 
university based entrepreneurship.  
 Third, we refined the preliminary design principles, integrating them with additional 
insights from the literature (Van Aken, 2004; Van Burg et al., 2008), which resulted in the 
final set of design principles reported in section 5.  
 
4. Empirical Results: Solutions for corporate venture transition processes 
The empirical study describes the transition process’ phases and actions, answering the 
research question of how and when to transfer corporate ventures. We distinguish three 
phases in the transition from a separated venture to a venture that is integrated in the 
corporate organization: the pre-transition, transition and post-transition phase. The pre-
transition phase is characterized by connecting and learning activities between the venture 
and the established business. In the transition phase, the actual hand-over moment takes 
place, where the venture is transferred to the corporate organization. The post-transition 
phase describes the period in which the venture is integrating in the corporate organization. 
The remainder of this section describes the main actions in these phases. The main lessons 
from the cases are summarized per transition phase and illustrated with quotes in Table 3. For 
the details of each of the cases, and their fit with the established business in terms of product-
market combinations, we refer to Table 1 and Table 2.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here  
---------------------------- 
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4.1 Transition preparation  
Managers involved in this study experienced that properly preparing the transition of the 
venture will avoid problems with the alignment of systems and procedures, and increase the 
legitimacy of the venture in post-transition. As stated by the new business development 
manager of ChemCo, involved in the development of Beta, it is essential to involve both the 
venture and the business unit in the transition preparation: 
If you decide together what the differentiating factors of the product are, its competitors, its 
pricing strategy, the customer leads and so on, you get a mutual understanding of how to run 
its business. 
Most managers recommended forming a dedicated transition team, consisting of people from 
the established business unit that have worked with a venture before, and people from the 
management team of the venture, complemented with transition management specialists. This 
team has the responsibility to prepare the venture transition. Therefore, they have to perform 
a readiness and capability gap assessment and to make a transition plan.  
 The readiness and capability gap assessment aims at determining the differences between 
the venture and the established business with regard to technology, business model and 
culture: 
You have to assess what is similar and what is different to this venture regarding your own 
business. And you have to determine that the marketing, sales and channel capabilities are in 
place in order to make the transition successful. (Omicron founder) 
This assessment helps to identify critical business functions that require extra attention from 
the venture or the established business to close the gap and facilitate the transition. The 
manager from the corporate venturing unit, responsible for the integration of Gamma in the 
established corporate organization, reported: 
It is essential to have some dedicated resources on critical business functions. For example, in 
this transition we saw sales potential, which means that we needed to ramp up production 
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from 2 to 40 million in just three years. Then you need dedicated resources on manufacturing 
and R&D to accomplish that goal, you need to fully understand how the product works and 
how to produce it. Besides, R&D was involved because the product and its production 
process could use some improvements. (Integration manager Gamma) 
A transition plan can be composed based upon this readiness and capability gap assessment, 
including milestones, actors, deliverables, and end-state definitions. This plan is essential for 
a good integration process. The Gamma venture illustrated that proper integration preparation 
may lead to successful venture integration. The corporate organization appointed a dedicated 
integration manager, who developed a plan, assembled a team and performed an analysis to 
mitigate transition problems.  
 
4.2 Training and personnel exchange in pre-transition phase 
To be able to understand the corporate ventures’ value and to facilitate the transition process, 
the corporate organization should acquire knowledge of the venture’s technology and 
business model. As our respondents indicated, involving established business’ personnel in 
the early phases of the venture’s development will increase the absorptive capacity at the 
established business. This increases the chance of making the right transition decisions (e.g., 
timing, which business unit) concerning the corporate venture. In this respect, the corporate 
business unit could make educational investments, as a manager of the business unit which 
adopted Alpha reported: 
You need to develop a feeling for the business [of the corporate venture]: what does the 
pipeline look like. And that takes time, to understand the work that has been done by five or 
six people in a few years. An awful lot of experience and information is needed, before you 
understand how the market works, what the key issues are and what the value proposition 
looks like.  
This is an ongoing effort during the transition process, as Omicron’s founder pointed out: 
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What we did was putting our sales employees at the established business unit to learn from 
each other. They needed to educate me (on ways of operating and so on) but I needed to 
educate them [established business] as well. 
By transferring some sales employees to the sales force of the established business the 
venture manager facilitated knowledge sharing between the venture and the future business 
host in a pre-transition phase. Providing dedicated training to key business unit employees 
increases absorptive capacity as well, as illustrated by a corporate business development 
manager of PhysCo.  
So, you need training to develop a diagnostic, a common language that helps people from 
both new business development and established business to understand the development of 
the ventures. 
 
4.3 Champions in all transition phases 
We found that aligning business unit management and venture stakeholders at different 
moments in the transition process is important for successful transfer of a corporate venture 
to the established business. Due to different business dynamics, logic, and risk taking 
behavior, established business units are often reluctant to interact with high uncertainty 
endeavors like corporate ventures. The venture manager should try to get the established 
business’ attention, as the founder of Omicron reported:  
So you are continuously explaining what your business is and waiting for them [established 
business’ management] to recognize the potential. And if you’re not in for it to explain this to 
everyone in the organization year-in year-out, you shouldn’t do it at all. 
The venture also needs the support of the established business to get through these strategic 
questionings. Getting the right corporate ‘champions’ was important for their development: 
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Champions at senior levels can help to guard the venture from a risk-averse environment, and 
even take on some of the stakeholder management or make supporting statements to push the 
venture through a narrow hole. (Founder of Delta) 
A manager from the corporate venturing unit of Physco added: 
The characteristics of the Delta venture were rather controversial and faced a lot of resistance 
in corporate organization. Due to the involvement of the CEO as champion, this venture 
managed to get through some tough meetings.  
The venture needs to find an owner in the business unit itself, someone who will step up for 
the venture in periodical review sessions, and is convinced of the value of the venture for its 
own business. In Alpha’s transition process, the ‘champion’ within the business unit played a 
crucial role in the venture’s transition, as the founder of Alpha reported: 
In this transition the excellent sponsor in the established business was very important. He was 
very enthused about Alpha technology and was planning to develop an Alpha technology 
platform at the established business. More importantly, he was able to sell the idea to higher 
management and to defend the plans, as there were some serious doubts.  
 
4.4 Transition timing 
The timing of the transition appears to be essential for the further performance of the 
corporate venture. Venture managers that were unsuccessful in their transition pointed out 
that this was mainly due to a premature decision to transfer. However, assessing the timing 
appears to be a complex task, with substantial risks involved. The data indicated that three 
elements influence the right transition timing: the criteria for adoption by the established 
business, the criteria for venture transition by the venture and the pressure of the corporate 
venturing unit to exit the incubator. One of the key criteria for new venture transition timing 
from the perspective of the corporate organization is the moment that the venture has 
achieved the first sales. The strategy director of the business unit that adopted Delta reported:  
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You really need to make sure that when you are transferring [the venture] into the business, 
you are at the point where you think it is going to make sales, so the market growth section. 
When the venture made its first sales and proved its position in the marketplace, then the 
established business gets interested in taking the risk of supporting the venture. At the side of 
the venture, this coincides with the moment when the support and assets of the established 
business are required for the venture’s development. This points towards first sales as a 
suitable moment for venture transition. As Delta’ founder indicated:  
We had an incentive to transfer because we were more and more in need of collaboration with 
departments of the established organization, such as marketing and finance. 
Similarly, the founder of Beta stated: 
When you are a venture manager around here, you make sure that at a certain moment your 
venture has sufficient volume, market information and potential that the mainstream business 
gets interested and that you involve major [established business] hosts in this process.  
The fact that a corporate venturing unit has only limited time, money and human resources to 
facilitate ventures puts pressure on venture development, as illustrated by Zeta’s founder: 
Well, for us it feels like there is also pressure from the incubator organization to find a host 
unit. As new ventures enter the incubator, more matured ventures need to exit as well.  
In our cases, it was the responsibility of the corporate venturing unit to find the proper 
organizational entity adopting the venture, whether inside or outside the corporate 
organization. The venturing unit acted as the matchmaker between the ventures and the 
established business units. To give the established business the opportunity to review the 
venture’s progress and the fit with its business, a continuous dialogue between corporate 
management, the established business unit and venture management was needed, mediated by 
personnel from the corporate venturing unit. Venturing unit personnel facilitated this dialogue 
by organizing seminars around the corporate ventures.  
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4.5 Post-transition venture autonomy 
The transition process requires the corporate venture to adapt to the new environment of the 
established business. Interviewees indicated that this change is difficult for both the corporate 
venture managers and the established business’s employees. Furthermore, the established 
business was uncomfortable with the corporate venture’s uncertainty and flexibility, and was 
often unable to properly manage the kind of small, uncertain activities that the corporate 
venture was exploring. A solution, as adopted in the companies studied, was to continue a 
certain separation of the corporate venture and the established business, even after the venture 
was transferred. Instead of drowning the venture into its business lines, the business unit 
adopting Alpha managed the venture as a ‘special project’, and in all the cases quick decision 
making was facilitated by short reporting lines (often directly to the business unit director). 
The actual level of continued separation depended on the degree of fit between the venture 
and the business unit in terms of type of clients, supply chains and distribution channels, 
business processes and geographical focus. For example, a manager of the business unit 
which adopted Gamma told:  
So, we deliberately chose to manage the venture rather stand-alone once it was adopted, 
because we realized that when all our different staffing departments would interfere, we 
would smother the development of the small start-up company.  
This practice is also confirmed by entrepreneurs themselves: 
In our specific case, this [transition] will work when we find a balanced working relationship 
with the business unit where the venture will become part of. This has to be somewhat 
autonomous, since we are used to work autonomously. (Zeta founder) 
Several of our cases show that finding the balance between integration and autonomy was the 
main challenge of post-transition venture development. After all, the venture was transitioned 
to a place in the established business in order to grow and develop into a mature business and 
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thus needed to learn from established procedures, implement particular systems and adopt 
certain standards. An integration manager of Chemco’s corporate venturing unit reported: 
Integrating corporate ventures is a two-sided coin; the venture cannot remain stand-alone in 
the established business, because there are significant changes: the business unit is the new 
owner, and has certain plans to be implemented, that’s why he bought it. So we need to find 
the right balance between not smothering the momentum in the venture’s development, 
meanwhile realizing the goals we set with the acquisition. 
 
4.6 Performance management and rewards in post-transition phase 
Decision making in the established business units was driven by institutionalized norms. 
Since the governance structure in the established organization rewarded risk reducing 
behavior, adopting the high risk level of the transferred venture was usually not rewarded. As 
the new business development manager of PhysCo reported: 
So at New Business Development there is punishment for inaction: the venture needs to make 
mistakes, in order to learn and that’s where the biggest culture shock with the established 
business occurs. When the transition is preliminary, the venture finds itself in a culture where 
mistakes are not accepted. 
Both the venture and the receiving business unit are affected by this difference in business 
culture and mindset. At PhysCo, this resulted in adjusted performance review criteria, 
indicated the new business development manager: 
So, when we review the performance of a business unit manager that has adopted a venture, 
this review should have two sides: one review for his operational excellence performance and 
one review on his business creation performance. And targets should be adjusted accordingly. 
The corporate organizations adapted the performance measurement systems of the corporate 
organization to those of the corporate venture. For instance, in the case of Delta, PhysCo 
changed the performance indicators, allowing unstable cash flows and focusing on product 
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development and time-to-market progress rather than absolute financial performance. This 
has two big advantages: management of the established business unit had less difficulties 
dealing with the uncertainty of the venture’s activities and venture personnel had fewer 
problems with integrating in the established business organization. The founder of Omicron 
indicated: 
You need to create a space were all sorts of business managers have the appropriate risk 
taking behavior to optimally run their business, meanwhile having a place where you can take 
some higher risk bets. They will start looking at their established business in a different way, 
because they know they can create a new business if they see the opportunity. 
 
5. Literature findings and design principles  
Based upon the empirical results discussed above, preliminary design principles were 
derived, using the procedures as described in the methods section. To further underpin these 
design principles, we conducted a literature review of relevant bodies of literature. The final 
set of design principles synthesizes the empirical findings and the literature. In this section, 
insights from the literature, as introduced in section 2, are related to the empirical findings 
and design principles are presented.  
 
5.1 Transition preparation  
A number of studies stress the importance of forming a pre-transition preparation (Kanter, 
1989; Kanter et al., 1991), consisting of composing a transition team (Maine, 2008; Rice et 
al., 2002), performing a transition readiness assessment from both the venture’s as well as the 
established corporation’s perspective (Kanter, 1989; Rice et al., 2002), and developing a 
transition plan (Rice et al., 2002). The empirical findings demonstrate the value of these 
recommendations, resulting in the following design principle: 
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Design principle 1. Prepare venture transition by composing a dedicated transition team, 
conducting a readiness and capability assessment, and developing a transition plan, 
serving to enhance the integration process and avoid integration problems afterwards. 
 
5.2 Training and personnel exchange in pre-transition phase 
Scholars have demonstrated the crucial role of absorptive capacity to mitigate cognitive 
barriers to enable combining existing capabilities with the corporate venture’s competences, 
resulting in recombination benefits (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Zahra et al., 2009; Zahra and 
Hayton, 2009). The necessity to develop absorptive capacity is highlighted in several studies, 
but description of practical interventions is mostly lacking. Here, our empirical findings 
provide more practical guidance, resulting in the following design principle: 
Design principle 2. The corporate organization should develop absorptive capacity by 
providing training and establishing personnel transfer between the venture and the 
business unit in the pre-transition phase. 
 
5.3 Champions in all transition phases 
Existing studies found that corporate ‘champions’ serve to advocate the corporate venture in 
the established business environment (Day, 1994; Garvin and Levesque, 2006; Henderson 
and Leleux, 2002). The empirical findings highlight that these corporate champions are very 
important in all the transition phases, from the very beginning to long after venture transition. 
A synthesis of the literature and empirical findings results in the following design principle:  
Design principle 3. The corporate organization and the corporate venture should identify 
and entitle strong champions (i.e., managers with discretionary power) in the established 
organization, who should be active in all phases of the venture transition process. 
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5.4 Transition timing 
Determining the correct timing of venture transition is difficult (Leifer et al., 2001), but 
existing literature is not providing guidance to decide on the right transition moment. Yet, the 
empirical findings give practical criteria, which are summarized in the following design 
principle: 
Design principle 4. The corporate venturing unit and the receiving business. The 
corporate venturing unit and the receiving business unit should jointly assess the 
transition timing. The best moment for transition is after the corporate venture has 
achieved the first sales and when support and assets of the established business become 
necessary to enable further growth.  
 
5.5 Post-transition venture autonomy 
The separation of established operations and corporate venturing has received much attention 
(Ambos et al., 2008; Dess et al., 2003; Maine, 2008; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996), as well as 
the establishment of a bridge between corporate ventures and the established business (Leifer 
et al., 2001). This bridge should involve senior team integration (Maine, 2008; Tushman and 
O'Reilly, 1996) and formal cross-functional interfaces (Jansen et al., 2009) to strategically 
legitimate the corporate ventures and to prepare the transition process (Garvin and Levesque, 
2006). However, existing literature does not address the questions whether the separation 
between the corporate venture and the established business should be maintained after the 
venture is transferred to an established business unit. The empirical findings indicate that 
maintaining post-transition autonomy is an important factor influencing post-transition 
success. This results in the following design principle: 
Design principle 5. The receiving business unit should maintain a degree of autonomy 
and flexibility of the venture in the post-transition phase by using direct reporting lines 
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that enable quick decision making (e.g., direct contact with the business unit director). 
The degree of autonomy depends on the fit between the venture and the business unit 
(i.e., clients, channels, processes and geography) and can be gradually reduced over time. 
 
5.6 Performance management and rewards in post-transition phase 
Existing literature confirms that an important aspect of post-transition management is to 
properly reward entrepreneurial behavior, which was the driver for the emergence of the 
venture (Sykes, 1986; Van de Vrande et al., 2006). Yet, this creates a tension between 
stimulating entrepreneurial behavior within the corporate venture and the interests of the 
established business with its focus on efficiency and control. Existing studies observe this 
problem, but scarcely propose practical solutions to the problem. Building upon the main 
insights from literature and the practical solutions from the empirical analysis, we propose the 
following design principle. 
Design principle 6. To enhance post transition performance of the corporate venture, the 
established business should align performance measurement systems to both the venture 
and the established business’ requirements (e.g., by performance indicators that accept 
unstable cash flows and focus on product development progress). 
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
5.7 Designing and implementing the process of corporate venture transition 
We were able to specify for each of the design principles the phase in which they should be 
implemented. This results in specific process-oriented design recommendations for 
transferring corporate ventures into the established business. Certain principles are in 
particular relevant in specific phases of the corporate venture transition and integration. 
Figure 2 displays the process view on implementing the design principles.  
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
In this study, we assessed how and when to transfer corporate ventures to the established 
business. Venture transition may rejuvenate the established business and is therefore 
sometimes favored over spinning off or selling the ventures. We provide a process 
perspective on corporate venture transition, which enables differentiating between actions in 
the different phases of the venture development and transfer process, and determining the 
venture transition timing. Extant literature does not integrate findings in a process framework 
(e.g., O'Connor and DeMartino, 2006) that specifies the particular actions in different phases 
of the corporate venturing transition process (Ford et al., 2010; O'Connor and DeMartino, 
2006). Although scholars have described the corporate venturing process from many 
viewpoints, such as the corporate parent (Burgelman and Sayles, 1984), the venturing unit 
(Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008), and the corporate venture (Maine, 2008), they are not integrated 
in a process model that describes potential interventions for the transition of the corporate 
venture to the established business environment. In addition, although recognizing that 
transition timing is in particular challenging, existing studies do not specify when the 
transition should occur (e.g., O'Connor and DeMartino, 2006). Our study contributes to this 
literature on corporate venturing in two ways. First, we provide a process perspective that 
offers design principles specifying how to successfully transfer corporate ventures. Second, 
we indicate when to transfer a corporate venture from the venturing unit to the established 
business.  
 Based on an empirical study of six corporate venture transition processes, we described 
how the corporate venture transition process in each of its phases (pre-transition, transition, 
and post-transition) could be approached. Thus, we provide insights in the process of 
successful venturing and we respond to the call for viewing internal corporate venturing as a 
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process (e.g., Burgelman, 1983; Dess et al., 2003; Miles and Covin, 2002; O'Connor and 
DeMartino, 2006). In particular, we extend the widely accepted four-phase process model of 
Burgelman (1983). This corporate venturing model’s final phase describes the process of 
fitting the venture in the strategic context. Our process model describes one possibility for the 
next step, by focusing on transferring the venture to an existing business unit. Using a design 
science approach, we integrated the results of our empirical study with existing literature in a 
set of design principles. The design principles guide actions to successfully transfer corporate 
ventures from the corporate venturing unit to the established corporate organization. In 
particular, our study specifies which principles should be applied before, during or after 
transition of the corporate venture to the established business. Some of the activities 
described in these design principles for the pre-transition phase correspond with specific 
strategic and contextual actions described by Burgelman (1983), such as building links with 
existing businesses and appointing corporate champions. Yet, by focusing on the transition 
moment, we provide new insights in preparing the venture transition, establishing the 
moment of venture transition, managing the transition and post-transition management.  
 Furthermore, we identified the moment for venture transition, indicating when to transfer 
a venture to the established company. The empirical study shows that the timing of venture 
transition is a crucial aspect, and our study provides more insight in the right moment of 
venture transition. Some studies have recognized the importance of timing as well, but they 
did not examine the precise moment of venture transition (Ford et al., 2010; Leifer et al., 
2001; O'Connor and DeMartino, 2006). Here, our study makes a significant contribution to 
the literature by providing more detailed insights. The data showed that three perspectives 
play a role in transition timing: the perspective of the receiving business unit, the perspective 
of the venture and the perspective of the corporate venturing unit. In addition, the ultimate 
criterion for transition timing appears to be whether the corporate venture is making first 
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sales or not. This ‘sales-criterion’ reflects the final element that is needed for the corporate 
venture to become a ‘real’ emergent organization according to the exchange criterion of Katz 
and Gartner (1988) and Thornhill and Amit (2001). Only when having first sales, the ventures 
leave the ‘gestation’ phase (Reynolds and Miller, 1992). In this respect, the expert knowledge 
of the practitioners indicated that a venture should first become somewhat mature (i.e., have 
its first sales), before it can be successfully transferred to an established business. If a venture 
has achieved its first sales market uncertainty is reduced, meanwhile increasing the venture’s 
need for corporate assets to fuel further growth. Thus, corporate venture and transition 
managers can use this sales criterion as one of their main decision rules for setting the 
moment of venture transition.   
 The design principles developed in this study have much practical value. They can be 
used by corporate venture transition managers, but may also inform venture teams and 
established business’ management. In each phase of venture transition, managers can consult 
the prescribed design principles to craft targeted design solutions for their specific context. 
Alternatively, the complete set of design principles can be used to develop a venture 
transition plan. Here, we in particular extend the work of Rice et al. (2002), who provided a 
list of ten transition uncertainties in the transition process. Our study validates a number of 
their recommendations (e.g., performing a transition readiness assessment), but more 
importantly, our study describes more in detail which actions could be done and specifies 
when they should be done.  
 Thus, the set of design principles provides an instrumental framework for practitioners, 
which is in particular relevant for two different situations. First, in contrast to literature 
arguing for a large degree of strategic fit (e.g., Gilsing et al., 2010), our analysis showed that 
transition problems were in particular surfacing when there was a large degree of overlap 
between the venture and the established business in terms of market and technology (see the 
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Beta venture). In this situation, implementing the design principles (e.g., design principle 6 
regarding a continued degree of autonomy) reduces the chance that the venture will be 
terminated during the transition because of the fear for cannibalization. Moreover, the design 
principles appear very relevant in case the venture is radically different from existing 
products and markets (see the Delta venture). In this situation, implementing the design 
principles (e.g., design principle 1 and 2) support building mutual understanding, searching 
for an appropriate business unit and making use of championing managers at both ends (see 
design principle 3).  
 The validity and appropriate application domain of this study’s results are limited in a 
number of ways. First, the external validity of our results with regard to the influence of the 
degree of fit between the established business and the corporate venture on the transition 
process is limited. To substantiate our conclusions, studies using a larger set of venture 
transition processes could further examine the differences in the transition processes between 
ventures that have a high degree of fit and ventures that have products, technologies and/or 
markets that differ significantly from the established business. Second, a design science 
approach serves to develop general design principles, but cannot claim that they will always 
work. Implicit assumptions or ill-understood confounding factors might reduce their validity. 
Third, as design knowledge is time and context dependent, the validity of the set of design 
principles is subject to future research that may serve to confirm, complement and refine 
these principles. For example, the principles regarding the transition moment are only based 
on our data. Future research could establish more transition criteria and advance the process 
view of corporate venturing and corporate venture transition. In addition, future 
developments in the corporate venturing practices may necessitate updating the set of design 
principles. Fourth, although the first validation of the design principles has been given by the 
study’s methodology, the ultimate validity test is the practical development of solutions based 
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on our set of design principles by independent designers and adapted to different contexts. 
This could provide additional insights in the comprehensiveness, coherence, context-
dependency and ease of use of the current set of design principles. As such, this set of design 
principles is a step toward a more integrated and practical understanding of corporate 
venturing transition processes.  
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FIGURE 2 
Process view on implementing design principles for corporate venture transition  
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FIGURE 1 
The research-design-development cycle (adapted from Van Burg et al., 2008) 
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TABLE 1. Characteristics of the six corporate ventures 
Pseudonym 
Corporate 
company 
Transition 
phase 
Number of 
years as 
corporate 
venture 
Period 
covered 
in case Industry 
Technology or 
product 
Existing or 
new product 
and market 
State of venture at  
end of period covered 
State of the host unit 
(turnover EBITDA) 
          
Alpha ChemCo Post-
transition 
10 2002-
2009 
Chemicals Fibers New product, 
existing market 
5 FTE employees, about EUR 10 
Mio turnover, technology platform 
for the host unit. 
Business Group 
Performance Materials, 
174 Mio EUR turnover, 
4000 employees. 
Beta ChemCo Transition 6 2006-
2009 
Painting Resins New product, 
existing market 
8 FTE employees, about  
EUR 1-2 Mio turnover, venture is 
split up. 
Business group Materials, 
1823 Mio turnover, 4670 
employees.  
Gamma ChemCo Post-
transition 
20 1990-
2009 
Nutrition Lipids New product, 
new market 
About 15 FTE employees 
about EUR 1 Mio turnover, 
standalone business. 
Business Group Nutrition, 
655 Mio EUR turnover, 
7000 employees. 
Delta PhysCo Post-
transition 
2 2006-
2009 
Consumer 
Electronics 
Massage 
products 
New product, 
new market 
10 FTE dedicated and around 50 
employees on contract, about EUR 
10 Mio turnover. Venture is 
integrating in host unit as new 
product category. 
Business Group 
Consumer; 8467 Mio 
turnover; around 2000 
employees. 
Omicron PhysCo Pre-transition 1 2005-
2009 
Healthcare Software 
product for 
healthcare 
New product, 
new market 
40 FTE employees, pre sales, pre-
transition, talking to several host 
units as new technology.  
Business unit Radiology; 
400-500 Mio EUR 
turnover, 100 employees. 
Zeta PhysCo 
 
Pre-transition 3 2000-
2009 
Healthcare Software 
systems for 
patients 
New product, 
new market 
30 FTE employees, EUR 3-5 Mio 
turnover, venture was in discussion 
with several host units, as additional 
product line. 
 
The search for a host unit 
was still ongoing. 
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TABLE 2. Corporate venture descriptions 
Alpha. Around 2002, during the development of the Alpha fiber technology, an innovation director at one of  
ChemCo’s business units noted that the technology was potentially promising. It was fully patented and only the 
application areas of the technology were unknown. He imagined that Alpha’s technology could be applied in different 
materials produced by the established business and that there was only a small threat of cannibalizing existing 
business. The innovation director decided to place Alpha outside the running business, since the applications of 
Alpha’s technology would most likely be outside the current business scope of  ChemCo. An engineer was staffed at 
the project and corporate funding paved the way for further development in a stand-alone start-up company. Product 
applications were developed and the first products were sold in 2005, but the long awaited ‘hockey-stick’ revenues did 
not come through. In 2007, a few investment rounds later, the Alpha venture was ready for spin out or divestiture. At 
that moment, knowing the recent acquisitions in consumer care, the established business’ emerging markets manager 
saw the market-potential of Alpha and he decided to retain the technology for  ChemCo. It turned out to be the right 
choice: the technology was used in several applications within the recently acquired activities and also multiple 
business units expressed their interest in the technology. The venture manager successfully sold the technology 
internally and positioned it within the emerging markets unit in the mainstream business organization. Soon multiple 
business groups of ChemCo use its technology in their new product developments.  
 
Beta. During a strategic dialogue at  ChemCo in 2006, the management of the Materials business group decided to 
separate the new business development activities from the established business activities to foster innovation. In one of 
the business domains industry regulations forced chemical companies to replace or adjust the materials in many 
consumer end-products before 2010. In the end of 2006,  ChemCo launched Beta to develop resins that adhered to 
these regulations. Because the Beta venture had large overlap in markets and technology with its established business’ 
counterparts, it was positioned outside the established business to remain innovative in its product development 
activities. The overlap resulted in large hostility to Beta, because it was perceived as threatening the existing business 
and customer base. But the established business was also depending on the innovations developed by Beta, and 
required a timely market introduction. Yet, being technology oriented, Beta’s employees were reluctant to release the 
products too early in the development process. After three years, in 2009, ChemCo’s management decided to change 
the organizational structure, and to spread the Beta activities among the business units that required its innovations to 
retain their competitive edge in their markets.  
 
Gamma. Around 1990, three pharmacists decided to start their own company in lipids that influence the appetite of 
humans. Soon the start-up expanded and penetrated a new market segment. About 10 years later, the company started 
to expand internationally and faced the challenge of extensive international growth to capture market share. The 
company was around 15 people and needed to grow in both production and organization to be able to penetrate the 
global obesity care products market. The founders realized that they needed a corporate parent. Meanwhile, ChemCo’s 
Venturing department already casted this fledging start-up as a potential acquisition target. Gamma was developing 
technology that fitted nicely with ChemCo’s technology roadmap, while the main assets required for production and 
distribution were quite similar. The markets targeted by Gamma’s technology and materials were not yet served by 
ChemCo, making Gamma an interesting business to acquire from ChemCo’s Nutrition Group perspective. After taking 
a minority share and placing the venture in its incubator program in 2006 for three years, ChemCo decided to acquire 
the venture, found a business host and transitioned the venture to its corporate realm. 
 
Delta. In 2006, during a corporate management development program, one of PhysCo’s top executives got the idea of 
serving a specialized care market that required a new type of product. Consequently she decided to pursue the 
challenge of introducing the radical, breakthrough innovation to PhysCo. The Delta venture was started in 2007 and 
placed carefully in the Lifestyle incubator, as its product, target customer segment and business model were recognized 
as radically different from any of PhysCo’s current businesses. Its product is a body care device (a massage product), 
using technology and design from PhysCo. Although Delta targets a totally different customer segment, these 
customers were often buying other PhysCo products. For the traditional sales channels, Delta could make use of the 
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network and assets of PhysCo, but Delta’s management decided to establish an online sales channel as well. Such an 
experiment was hard for the established business units, as it could harm their close relations with the traditional sales 
channels. In terms of markets and technology, the Delta venture posed no threat to established business units, and so a 
cooperative mindset towards its development was present. As soon as first sales were made in 2008, the venture 
required corporate assets to facilitate further growth. When the incubator’s capacity dwindled in the end of 2008, 
corporate management supported the quest for a proper landing spot in one of PhysCo divisions. After a series of 
venturing seminars, one business unit decided to invest in the venture and the transition of activities commenced.  
 
Omicron. Based on its strong R&D capabilities in imaging technology, PhysCo developed a business in the healthcare 
imaging area: hardware and software to support the diagnosis and research work of physicians. In 2005, they 
developed digital imaging technology for a type of research that was at that time very time consuming. Being aware of 
its potential and radical character, the management of PhysCo decided to place Omicron in the incubator program and 
hired an entrepreneur to accelerate its development in 2006. The entrepreneur established a team and developed 
technology and products, prepared markets and sales channels, and found ways to pitch Omicron activities internally to 
facilitate synergies between established and venture activities. By using PhysCo’s current technology and expertise the 
Omicron development was closely related to PhysCo’s divisions, although it was targeting a completely different 
market segment. Because of overlap in technology but not in business model or markets, established business units 
perceived the Omicron venture not as a direct threat to their own businesses. Recognizing the need for internal support 
and funding to facilitate further development, the entrepreneur started to collaborate closely with corporate 
departments, in search of a business host or investor. 
 
Zeta. Zeta’s founder was already working for one of PhysCo’s divisions when he in 2000 recognized a need at his 
hospital clients for innovative hospitality services. Because the founder was familiar with service concepts in the 
different markets where PhysCo was selling its products, he soon realized that there was large market potential for 
software systems for patients. Besides that, he knew PhysCo had the capabilities to enter this market segment. In 
parallel, PhysCo’s research was developing similar products targeting a similar market segment. In 2001, both 
activities were combined in the Zeta venture. At the same time, PhysCo was starting an incubator program, and 
although Zeta was already developing products and talking to prospects, it became one of the first ventures in the 
Healthcare incubator. Zeta’s development was closely related to PhysCo’s established business, as Zeta was selling to 
the same customers. Zeta could profit from the sales channels and relationships, but also was perceived to threaten 
these carefully established relationships if Zeta’s activities would be discontinued. In 2006, once sales picked up with 
projects throughout Europe, Zeta matured and required more assets from the established company. Its success caused 
tensions with the established business units. In 2009, the challenging environment of Zeta consisted of managing client 
relationships, working together with the established business units, and in the meantime looking for a business unit 
where Zeta could be transitioned to.  
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TABLE 3. Design principles related to themes from interviews  
 
Design 
Principle Phase Theme and Quote 
   
1 Pre-transition Dedicated transition team. “A review team was responsible for the transition, BU director, production, 
NPD, all possible stakeholders.” (New business development manager of Beta)  
Readiness and capability assessment. “It is important to start integrating as soon as possible. It should 
be part of the assessment of the business host: how to integrate [the venture] in our activities.” 
(Integration manager of Gamma) 
 
2 Pre-transition Provide training. “So, he [the integration manager] was a large share of the time at the venture’s side to 
smoothen everything and to train people and prepare processes for the transfer.” (Manager of the 
business unit which adopted Gamma)  
Personnel transfer. “People within the venture project work on a certain part of the research and then 
new people come in. At the moment that certain work packages are finished, they become available to 
collaborate with established business’ people to facilitate knowledge management. The people hired 
for the development are in the same lab as the people from mainstream business that support the 
delivery.” (Founder of Beta) 
 
3 Pre-transition, 
transition and 
post-transition 
Corporate champions. “Venture transition is in the first place something that grows organically, instead 
of being pushed from above. It is extremely important to create that situation instead of being force-
fitted. That has a lot to do with lobbying; step by step, but in the end with the support of higher 
management to make it go in a certain direction.” (Founder of Zeta)  
Corporate champion in pre-transition. “Actually my role at the start was that I had the task to initiate 
the interest in this venture. We discussed the strategic roadmap and decided that this was an area that 
we would start exploring. So I invited them [Gamma venture’s management] at my office, together 
with the venturing board of ChemCo, and stayed in the team the whole process.” (Manager of the 
business unit which adopted Gamma)  
 
4 Transition  First sales as a criterion. [Interviewer:] “Are you already considering transition?” [Founder of 
Omicron:] “No, it is too early. That only happens when you can really contribute to the profitability 
of a business [unit].”  
First sales as a criterion. “So what you see is that people are thinking, it [the venture] needs to go to 
the mainstream at some point but that mainstream business says that they won’t pay for such 
uncertain activities. So there is some time required before you are certain enough for the mainstream 
business to adopt, and depending on your business that may take some years. So when the market is 
really adopting your products, and there are clients and your orderlist is growing, then the mainstream 
business will dare to invest.” (Founder of Omicron) 
 
5 Pre-transition 
and post-
transition 
Venture autonomy in pre transition. “The way we would like to structure it, theoretically, is that the 
venture accomplishes the alpha phase [a phase in the incubator’s venturing methodology], in which  
there still is a kind of shelter from pressures from the business, and we have to kind of find out what it 
wants to do.” (VP Strategy PhysCo Incubator) 
Venture autonomy in post transition. “What we got into was quite successful, because the host unit was 
managed like a portfolio of activities, without much staffing and with modest distance between 
management and the business. So they let the businesses report on finance and strategy and don’t 
bother too much about other things.” (Founder of Delta)  
 
6 Post-transition Performance measurement alignment. “So, when a venture reaches a certain state of maturity, you may 
start measuring its performance. You may look at product development progress, market education 
progress, and regulatory approval progress.” (Founder of Omicron) 
 
Performance measurement alignment. “At the time of transition, we agreed upon a certain set of 
performance measurement criteria with the new business development board, but we should have 
involved the host unit as well, because they may have different interests. Some elements are 
important for us and for the incubator, but for the hosting unit sales may be more important. That’s 
what counts in the end, they want to develop a new business, and that has to be profitable. We are 
now in a phase were sales is becoming more important, but we need to learn from our mistakes as 
well.” (Founder of Delta) 
 
 
